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Abstract
We examine the interest rate sensitivity of both deposits and credits at Islamic and con-
ventional banks in Turkey. We find that the bank lending channel is especially operative
for Islamic banks. Impulse responses for conventional and Islamic banks reveal that Islamic
bank depositors’ sensitivity to policy rate changes are substantially larger than that of con-
ventional bank depositors. Next to heavily dependence on deposit funding, we consider that
inertia in Islamic bank deposit rates impedes these banks to keep those depositors who con-
sider the opportunity cost of monetary policy rates is unbearable. At the lending side, we
obtain similar results, implying that tight monetary policy leads to a larger contraction in
Islamic bank credits. This finding is a reflection of the favorable attitude of Islamic banks
towards SME financing. When similar relationships are analysed for currency and inflation
shocks, we again find larger responses for Islamic banks showing the cyclical nature of SME
credits.
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1 Introduction
The bank lending channel posits that central banks –at least in part– can control banking
sector’s ability to lend by adjusting the reserve supply via open market operations. On a contrac-
tionary policy, open market operations of central banks drain reserves and hence deposits from
the banking system. If banks are not able to find alternative sources of funding to compensate
for this deposit withdrawal, the supply of bank loans will decrease. Although this spillover chain
is well established for varying size (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Stein and Kashyap, 2000), liquidity
(Stein and Kashyap, 2000; Ashcraft, 2006) and capitalization (Kishan and Opiela, 2000) of banks;
there is still lack of evidence on how this mechanism works for different bank types. Studying
the monetary transmission mechanism for different bank types is relevant because it may have
different impacts on bank lending. This is especially important to identify how effectively central
banks can influence the level of reserves (deposits) and, as a consequence, bank lending (credits).
In this study, we empirically compare the bank lending channel in a dual banking system where
Islamic and conventional banks operate side by side. Since the bank lending channel incorporates
the behavior of customers and creditors in a single transmission mechanism, we will be able to
understand different behavioral patterns of both of these groups in different banking schemes.
Although Islamic and conventional banks fulfill similar intermediary roles, moral foundations
of Islamic banking make Islamic banks and their depositors distinct from those of conventional
banks. From a customer’s perspective, Islamic banks contribute to financial inclusion by attracting
religiously motivated customers into the system (e.g. Kumru and Sarntisart, 2016). Islamic banks
may represent a morally appealing alternative for those customers whose financial preferences are
driven by religious beliefs. Religiosity also appears to be a major determinant for consumer choice
behavior (Essoo and Dibb, 2004), irrespective of the religion the individual is attached to (see e.g.
Wilkes et al., 1986). For instance, Miller and Hoffmann (1995) report a negative correlation between
religiosity and attitudes towards risk at individual level. Similarly, Hilary and Hui (2009) find that
firms located in US counties with high levels of religiosity tend to exhibit lower risk exposure as
measured by the variances in returns on assets or equity. In a similar vein, as argued by Abedifar
et al. (2013), Islamic bank depositors are more sensitive to bank performance and macroeconomic
2
shocks and demonstrate greater withdrawal risk than their conventional counterparts.
From the bank’s perspective too, whether or not having a religious affiliation might have an
influence on the willingness to supply credit. Since Islamic banks employ several unique financial
models and contracts, the customer portfolios of Islamic and conventional banks may substantially
vary. Further, recent research suggests that conventional banks put more weight on collateral in
their credit allocation decisions (e.g. Shaban et al., 2014; Aysan et al., 2016b). Because of their
opaque nature, especially the small and medium–sized enterprises (SMEs) segment of the market
seems to face credit constraints from this practice (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Islamic banks,
on the other hand, may be more attractive to SMEs since they substantially relieve collateral re-
quirements by making use of murabaha contracts. Moreover, in a dual banking system, conventional
banks are generally more established houses and have solid relations with larger firms who have
”hard” information. Islamic banks, which still hold marginal shares in the banking systems, may
fulfill SMEs’ credit demand by relying on ”soft” information. Despite their strong growth, Islamic
banks still do not hold a significant place in the banking industry, which forces them to target
the untapped SME market. Recent empirical results using data from Indonesia (Shaban et al.,
2014) and Turkey (Aysan et al., 2016b) show that Islamic banks’ willingness to finance SMEs is
significantly higher than that of conventional banks. However, given the growing body of evidence
that small businesses are more exposed to economic and policy shocks (see e.g. Berger and Udell,
2002; OECD, 2012; ECB, 2016), it can be argued that Islamic bank lending is more sensitive to
monetary and economic shocks.
Especially since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, Islamic banking has emerged as a
viable complementary scheme in the global banking system. Parallel to the rising visibility of Islamic
banking sector, growing academic attention has resulted in a wide range of research foci. A number
of studies have focused on the efficiency differences between Islamic and conventional banks (e.g.
Samad, 1999; Abdul-Majid et al., 2010; Srairi, 2010), while others have documented operational
differences between them (e.g. Iqbal, 2001; Beck et al., 2013; Elnahass et al., 2013; Daher et al.,
2015; Ibrahim, 2016). Another stream of research has explored the resilience of Islamic banks with
the outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis (Ciha`k and Hesse, 2010; Hasan and Dridi, 2011;
Abedifar et al., 2013; Rajhi and Hassairi, 2013). Closer to this study, there is a growing literature
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that examines the impact of monetary policy and several transmission channels in a dual banking
environment. Among these studies, for instance, Sukmana and Kassim (2010) and Zulkhibri and
Sukmana (2016) examine, respectively, the behavior of Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic banks in
the monetary transmission process. Both of these studies conclude that Islamic financial institutions
play a significant role in the monetary transmission. Zaheer et al. (2013) study the differences of
banks’ responses to monetary shocks across bank size, liquidity and bank type in Pakistan. They
find that Islamic banks’ reaction to monetary shocks is relatively limited, and conclude that the
bank lending channel may weaken when Islamic banking grows in relative importance. In line
with the above–mentioned literature, this paper first separately examines the presence of the bank
lending channel for the transmission of monetary policy through Islamic and conventional banks
in Turkey. We then provide an in–depth discussion of the observed differences, and explore the
potential reasons for this discrepancy by conducting additional exercises and robustness checks.
This study contributes to the strand of literature that investigates the behavioral differences
between Islamic and conventional finance (Abdelsalam et al., 2014; BinMahfouz and Hassan, 2012).
While the influence of monetary shocks is frequently discussed for conventional banks, research in
examining the role of Islamic banks in the monetary transmission process is still very limited. We
focus on the change in depositing and lending behavior at Islamic and conventional banks as a
response to monetary shocks. In doing so, this paper contributes to the literature in a number
ways. First, Turkey presents a fertile testing ground since Islamic banks operate side by side with
conventional banks for over thirty years. Subsequent government initiatives have gradually allowed
Islamic banking to expand their business activities. Especially the reforms and regulations in the
last decade have effectively removed some discriminatory regulations against Islamic banks. The
dual structure of the Turkish banking allows us to conduct a comparative analysis on the impact
of monetary policy shocks between Islamic and conventional banks, both of which are now subject
to the same regulation and supervision. Hence, the lack of different regulatory treatment leads
us to attribute any different response to operational and behavioral differences between these two
banking modes. Second, by making use of a complementary dataset, we point to the role of SME
lending as one of the major reasons behind the different responses to monetary shocks. SMEs
are recognized as the engines of economic growth and key contributors to employment, but face
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significant barriers to access to external finance. By introducing the SME segment of the credit
market into our analyses, we are able to reveal whether the different effects of monetary policy
on lending between Islamic and conventional banks are driven by these banks’ differences in SME
financing behavior. As a final contribution, we examine depositors’ and creditors’ responses to
policy rate changes using a panel vector autoregression (panel–VAR) framework, which controls for
the rarely addressed bank–level heterogeneity in bank lending channel studies.
Our results support the existence of the bank lending channel in Turkey. In response to a
policy rate increase, banks are confronted with deposit withdrawals since customers seek alternative
investment opportunities with higher returns. This decline in deposits, in turn, decreases the
volume of bank lending. We, however, observe that responses of deposits and credits to monetary
shocks are larger for Islamic banks. Impulse responses for conventional and Islamic banks reveal
that Islamic bank depositors’ sensitivity to policy rate changes is substantially larger than their
conventional counterparts. As a response to one standard deviation policy rate increase, deposit
withdrawals at Islamic banks exceeds 5% at the end of six quarters, whereas this is only around
2% for conventional banks. We find similar results vis–a´–vis lending activities, indicating that the
demand for credits is more affected in Islamic banks following an policy rate change. We discuss the
potential reasons how and why deposits and credits in Islamic banks respond more pronouncedly
to policy rate changes.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature and presents
the motivation. Section 3 briefly introduces the dual–banking system in Turkey. Section 4 intro-
duces the data and methodology. Section 5 discusses the main findings and presents some robustness
checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Brief Literature Survey and Motivation
This study examines the presence of the bank lending channel by verifying the responses of
bank loans and deposits to changes in monetary policy stance. In their seminal work, Bernanke
and Blinder (1992) argue that reserves in the banking system drains steadily following an increase
in the policy rate. In a chain reaction, a deposit shock triggered by a monetary policy change
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impacts bank lending. Since it will be costly and timely to complement the withdrawn deposits
through other sources, banks accordingly tune their lending.
How this transmission mechanism works for Islamic banks is not clear. The transmission can
be ineffective among Islamic banks since Islamic banking operations ideally should not be linked
to interest rates. An a priori proposition would suggest that Islamic banks and their depositors
are insensitive to policy rate changes since the main pillar of Islamic banking is the prohibition of
riba (interest). Islamic banks operate like equity–based companies where depositors are treated as
quasi–shareholders (Khan and Mirakhor, 1989; Aysan et al., 2016a). In this business model, banks
share their earnings with their depositors according to a pre–agreed rate of return. The ideal mode
of Islamic financing which is based on profit–and–loss sharing (PLS) may hint that conventional
monetary policy tools should not be operational on Islamic banks.
Although Islamic banking strictly prohibits interest, the monetary transmission mechanism may
still be operational in these banks based on several grounds. First, contrary to the propositions of
the PLS paradigm, it is known that the current Islamic banking practice primarily relies on the
non–PLS model (Khan, 2010). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that Islamic deposit rates are
closely pegged to conventional deposit rates (Dar and Presley, 1999; Chong and Liu, 2009; Cevik
and Charap, 2015). Alam and Parinduri (2017) explore the possible reasons why Islamic banks
mostly prefer non–PLS instruments as opposed to the wisdom in Islamic finance that suggests
risk sharing. By hypothesizing that one of the reasons is the poor contracting environment, the
authors investigate whether Islamic banks shift to PLS instruments with increasing quality of
contracting environment. The findings of their study indicate that Islamic banks’ tendency of non–
PLS instruments is not driven by the quality of contracting environment. As Alam and Parinduri
(2017) conclude, the policies for enhancing contracting environment are unlikely to change Islamic
banks’ asset preferences. Hence, because of the prevalence of non–PLS products and inefficacy of
policies to encourage PLS products, it is possible that depositors and creditors in Islamic banks
may also respond to policy rate changes. Second, the argument that Islamic bank depositors are
expected not to leave their banks as a response to policy rate changes is hard to defend.1 Islamic
1Demiralp and Demiralp (2015) argue that period of adjustment following a monetary policy action in
Islamic banking constitutes a conundrum between religious convictions and optimal return judgments for
Islamic bank depositors.
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bank depositors may reconsider their investment at their banks as policy rate changes potentially
make alternative Shariah–compliant investment opportunities more attractive, e.g. real estate
investments. Therefore, it is hard to decisively argue that Islamic banks are not responsive to
monetary policy. Third, Islamic banks may not be as successful as conventional banks to restore
the level of deposits after a positive policy rate shock. Conventional banks are better positioned to
adjust their deposit interest rates quickly to attract displaced deposits, while Islamic banks react
more sluggishly. This adjustment delay may hinder these banks to collect efficiently the withdrawn
deposits. While some pious individuals will keep their money in Islamic banks no matter what the
policy rate is, the others may ”arbitrage”.2 Fourth, Islamic banks have reduced access to (Shariah–
compliant) non–deposit funding sources which amplify the lending channel through these banks.
When deposits are reduced as a response to monetary shocks, Islamic banks often have limited
capacity to compensate these withdrawn deposits. Finally, the favorable attitude of Islamic banks
towards largely bank–dependent companies (or SMEs) may be another reason for why the bank
lending channel may be amplified through these banks. Monetary and macroeconomic shocks
impact SMEs more severely than larger firms in their demand for credits.
The impact of monetary policy in a dual banking system has been examined in a number of
studies. Ito (2013), for example, examines the Malaysian banking sector and finds that Islamic
deposit returns and conventional interest rates co–move in Malaysia. The author interprets this
finding as the existence of significant commons in Islamic and conventional banks. Likewise, Ergec
and Arslan (2013) examine Turkish banking system and find that the impact of monetary shocks
on Islamic and conventional deposits are similar. Likewise, El Hamiani Khatat (2016) discusses
key issues for conducting monetary policies in countries where Islamic banks and conventional
banks coexist. Having underlined similarities and differences, there is almost a consensus among
researchers that Islamic banking should be taken as an autonomous process in conducting monetary
policy. Sukmana and Kassim (2010) imply the necessity of a dual monetary policy formulation, as
their findings raise the importance of Islamic banks in the monetary transmission in dual banking
systems. The dual policy formulation is also underlined by Haron and Nursofiza Wan Azmi (2008)
who investigate the impact of selected economic variables on deposits in the Malaysian dual banking
2We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting us this explanation for a possible reason.
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system. The authors find that deposits respond differently at Islamic and conventional banks and
discuss the role of religious beliefs in depositors’ banking decisions.
Despite some evidence on the relation between monetary policy and several return rates in
Islamic banking, hitherto analysis did not explore the underlying reasons for why the bank lending
channel works differently in these two different banking schemes. In this paper, we seek to better
understand the role of operational differences in the explanation of different monetary transmissions
between Islamic and conventional banks.
3 A Brief History of Dual Banking in Turkey
Turkey’s banking history is closely in resemblance with other emerging economies. The absence
of adequate resources and the need for rapid industrialization instigated policymakers to use the
banking system as a pool of financing for development. The government control over the bank-
ing system, where only conventional banks were operating, was substantial till the 1980s. Along
with stiff entry barriers, interest rate controls, and directed credit programs, the competition and
efficiency in the Turkish banking system were hampered to such degree that, by the 1980s, heavy
government involvement had relaxed significantly (Denizer, 1997).
Beginning from June 1980, more deregulatory and liberal measures were adopted in the Turkish
banking system. The initial outcome of these measures was relatively positive during this period. It
is reported that efficiency gains were remarkable after the implementation of various deregulatory
measures (Isik and Hassan, 2002; Zaim, 1995). It is also claimed that the integration process of
the Turkish banking system to global finance brought about enhanced financial technology and
better–equipped human capital (Denizer, 1997). The deregulatory measures allowed cross–border
fund flows that the country was in need of, and specifically lifted entry barriers to the banking
system. Related with the scope of this study, the adoption of deregulatory measures have attracted a
significant number of banks into the system, including Islamic banks. While the early motivation for
the establishment of Islamic banks in Turkey was to attract foreign capital to the country, stimulated
partly by the growing awareness of the Muslim population, Islamic banking have increasingly
formulated itself as an alternative to the conventional banking model.
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Turkey’s Islamic finance debuted in 1985 with the Bahrain–based Al–Baraka Turk Finance
House (Albaraka Tu¨rk Finans Kurumu in Turkish) and Saudi–based Faisal Finance House (Faisal
Finans Kurumu in Turkish). Kuveyt Turk followed these ones and joined the system in 1989. In
the 1990s, Anadolu Finance House, Ihlas Finance House, and Asya Finance House (Anadolu Finans
Kurumu, I˙hlas Finans Kurumu, and Asya Finans Kurumu in Turkish, respectively) entered the
market with 100 percent domestic capital. As the name ”Finance House” suggests, these institutions
did not enjoy the same status as conventional banks. Until late 2005, these banks remained subject
to discriminatory regulations which introduced certain rights to conventional banks but not to the
finance houses. For instance, Aysan et al. (2013) convey that Islamic banks were not fully covered
by a deposit guarantee scheme, although a comprehensive scheme was used to cover conventional
deposits.
In line with the interest globally towards Islamic banking, Turkey has introduced several favor-
able regulatory changes to Islamic banks. The legislative changes in late 2005 have eliminated the
deprivations and provided a more constructive environment for Islamic banks. Islamic banks even-
tually gained a legal ”bank” status that led to equal regulatory treatment. Finally, signalling the
governments’ favorable attitude, since 2015, two more banks, Ziraat and Vakif Participation banks
(Ziraat Katılım Bankası and Vakıf Katılım Bankası in Turkish, respectively) have been authorized
to operate as the first state–owned Islamic banks.
Newly established state–owned Islamic banks may be encouraging for the future of the Islamic
banking in the country, however the capacity of Islamic banks to use various financing sources is
still limited. The single formulation of monetary policy and binding constraints in Islamic banking
originating from Islamic principles lead to certain challenges for these banks. While documenting
the deficiencies in the Turkish Islamic banking, Okumus¸ (2016) notes the lack of a time deposit
scheme having less than thirty days maturity. The author informs that especially those corporate
clients needing their money in less than thirty days accounts for their liquidity management are
left out with no viable option. As Okumus¸ (2016) argues, the options they have in hand are mostly
interest–bearing. They either go to a conventional bank for an overnight or some other shorter
maturity date repurchase (repo) agreement, or for a time deposit account maturing in a chosen
time period, or for a liquid/short–term bond and bills; or they put the money in checking accounts
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of a participation bank with no return. Having pointed out that recent regulations treat Islamic
banks equally with conventional banks, regulatory arrangements and monetary policy formulation
toward banks in the Turkish dual banking system is also uni–shaped. Reserve requirements that
were introduced as an active tool in addition to the traditional policy instrument of the one–week
repo auctions rate, for instance, do not discriminate Islamic banks in anyway. However, the issuance
of sukuk, an Islamic fixed income instrument, introduced certain flexibility for the government and
corporations to raise funds. The growing sukuk market also allows Islamic banks to access short–
term liquidity funding, as the Central Bank of Turkey (Tu¨rkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası in
Turkish) began accepting sukuks as an eligible collateral in open market operations.
4 Data and Methodology
We compare Islamic and conventional banks in their responses to monetary shocks. To do
this, we use an unbalanced panel data set from the Central Bank of Turkey for the period of
2004Q3–2012Q4. The unbalanced panel comprises 35 conventional banks and four Islamic banks.
Balance sheet and income statement information for conventional banks are derived from the Banks
Association of Turkey, and those of Islamic banks are from the Participation Banks Association of
Turkey.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We estimate a panel–VAR model with quarterly data for Turkey. We then obtain impulse
response functions (IRFs) to measure the response of deposits and credits to monetary shocks in
conventional and Islamic banks.3 In the panel–VAR methodology, the key assumption is that the
variables that enter the system earlier affect the following variables contemporaneously and with
a lag, while the variables that come later affect the previous variables only with a lag (Love and
Zicchino, 2006). This implies that the variables that enter earlier are more exogenous and the later
ones are more endogenous. We use the following variables in the listed Choleski ordering: policy
rate (ir), US Dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate (fx), consumer price index (cpi), total deposits
(deposits), and total credits (credits).
3Islamic banks in Turkey are named as Participation Banks.
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. The main
variables in the table are credits and deposits which are presented for the whole sample and for
conventional and Islamic banks separately. We log–transform credits and deposits data (credits and
deposits), and use the others on their levels.4 We use overnight money market rate of the Central
Bank of Turkey as the policy rate, (ir). We compute the average overnight rates per quarter
during the sample period to proxy for policy rates. The quarterly average of US Dollar/Turkish
lira exchange rate is used as the foreign exchange variable (fx).
The deposits data in our analysis comprises those deposits which are covered by the deposit
insurance scheme. Next to the fact that insured deposits constitute the bulk of total deposits,
insured deposit holders may display different behavior than uninsured deposit holders with respect
to monetary shocks (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Karas et al., 2013). Andries and Billon
(2010), for instance, theoretically show that deposits under insurance exhibit a more stable pattern
in response to a monetary shock. In case of increasing bank risk and corresponding monetary policy
interventions, for instance, uninsured deposit holders’ response to monetary shocks is augmented
with the risk of bank failure. Deposit insurance therefore eliminates these possibilities and enables
us to concentrate on the relationship among monetary policy, credit provision and deposits.
We use the panel–VAR methodology which extends the traditional VAR approach to a panel
setting to control for bank–level heterogeneity. As in the traditional VAR approach, the variables
in the system are treated as endogenous. We specify our model of order s as follows:
Zi,t = Γ0 + fi + Γ1Zi,t−1 + Γ2Zi,t−2 + ...+ ΓsZi,t−s + εi,t. (1)
In this specification the variables ir, fx, cpi, deposits and credits are the components of a
vector Z in the VAR system for bank i and time t. Since the time dimension of our panel is
small, we estimate a one–lag panel–VAR to investigate the depositors’ and creditors’ responses to
policy rate changes. In all estimations, we control for bank level heterogeneity by incorporating
fi as proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). We exploit ”Helmert procedure” that uses forward
4See Demiralp and Demiralp (2015) and Love and Turk Ariss (2014) for similar variable transformations
in their VAR framework.
11
mean–differencing. In this procedure, the fixed effects (fi) are eliminated by the transformation in
deviations from forward means.
Let z¯kim =
Ti∑
s=m+1
zkis
Ti−m denotes the means obtained from the future values of a variable z
k
i , a
variable in the p–variable vector Zi = (z
1
i , z
2
i , ..., z
k
i , ..., z
p
i )
′
, at t = m. Ti denotes the last period
of data available for a given bank series. Let ε¯kim denotes the same transformation for ε
k
im, where
εi = (ε
1
i , ε
2
i , ..., ε
k
i , ..., ε
p
i )
′
. Hence we get following variables after Helmert transformation, z˜kim =
δit(z
k
im− z¯kim) and ε˜kim = δit(εkim− ε¯kim) where δit =
√
Ti−m
Ti−m+1 . The final transformed model is thus
given by:
Z˜i,t = Γ0 + fi + Γ1Z˜i,t−1 + Γ2Z˜i,t−2 + ...+ ΓsZ˜i,t−s + ε˜i,t. (2)
This transformation satisfies the orthogonality assumption between transformed variables and
lagged regressors. Therefore, we can use lagged dependent variables as instruments and estimate
the coefficients by system GMM (Love and Zicchino, 2006).
To analyse the potential effects of monetary shocks (ir) on deposits and credits (deposits
and credits), we generate impulse response functions for each variable to show how each variable
responds to individual shocks of other variables in the system. In this approach, the response of
a variable to the shock of transmitted from another variable is estimated where shocks to other
variables in the system are held constant. To do so, it is necessary to decompose the residuals so
that they are orthogonal which can be accomplished by ordering the variables, namely Choleski
ordering (Hamilton, 1994).
5 Results
5.1 Empirical Findings
We initially conduct a unit–root test on all the variables used in the analysis to address concerns
about the presence of unit roots. We use Fisher’s test statistics for panel unit root (see Maddala
and Wu, 1999), since this test does not require a balanced panel unlike the Im–Paseran–Shin
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test proposed by Im et al. (2003). Table 2 presents the results of the Fisher Augmented Dickey–
Fuller and Fisher Phillips–Perron unit root tests, where the null hypothesis is that all series are
non–stationary and the alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the series in the panel is
stationary. Since panel–VAR employs Helmert–transformed variables, we present the results for
the original variables and their Helmert transformations. Panel unit root test results suggest that
both Fisher Augmented Dickey–Fuller and Fisher Phillips–Perron reject the presence of unit roots
at conventional significance levels. We therefore consider all variables as stationary based on the
test results and use Helmert–transformed variables in the panel–VARs.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Before discussing the Panel–VAR results, we draw scatter plots of deposits and credits on the
policy rate for both Islamic and conventional banks. Figure 1 and 2 fit a simple regression line to
have an idea whether the expected outcome of monetary shocks is observable on raw credits and
deposits data. These two figures demonstrate that, regardless of the bank type, deposits and credits
are negatively associated with policy rates. The slopes of figures pertaining to Islamic banks are,
however, steeper, mimicking the larger response of Islamic banks’ customers to monetary shocks.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Since the IRFs are constructed from the estimated coefficients in panel–VAR models, the stan-
dard errors of estimated coefficients need to be calculated. Monte Carlo simulations are used for
generating confidence intervals for the IRFs. This is conducted by taking random draws of the
models’ coefficients, using the estimated coefficients and their variance-covariance matrix. We take
500 draws. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the results are used to interpret on the confidence
intervals of the impulse responses. If the confidence intervals do not span the zero line, we interpret
the results are significant, i.e. rejecting the hypothesis that impulse responses are zero.
We report how credits and deposits respond to monetary, foreign exchange and inflation shocks.5
5All impulse response functions are provided in Figure 11 and 12 in the Appendix. We discuss main
findings derived from the responses of credits and deposits to the shocks in economic and monetary variables.
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We first display the conventional and Islamic bank deposit responses to monetary shocks in Figure
3. The results suggest that depositors in both Islamic and conventional banks respond negatively to
monetary shocks. When we are interested in the degree of sensitivity, we observe that Islamic bank
depositors respond more strongly to monetary shocks. Deposits’ response to a shock in policy rates
is larger than in conventional banks: a one standard deviation policy rate shock is associated with
a 5% withdrawal after two quarters in Islamic banks, whereas in conventional banks the withdrawal
could only reach to 2% at the end of four quarters. Higher sensitivity of Islamic bank depositors can
be explained by the prohibition of interest in Islamic banks. Monetary changes create a period of
adjustment in Islamic bank rates as Islamic banks distribute ex–post returns, whereas conventional
banks can more abruptly accommodate policy rate changes. Demiralp and Demiralp (2015) argue
that this adjustment process is a good laboratory setting to explore whether Islamic bank depositors
are loyal to their banks. As our results suggest, during the time of adjustment Islamic bank
depositors may withdraw their deposits once the returns offered by alternative investments are
higher at the new monetary condition.
Figure 4 demonstrates the credits’ response to monetary shocks. Similar to the responses in
deposits, Islamic banks’ response in credits to monetary shocks is again larger than the one observed
in conventional banks. While the negative response to a positive policy rate shock exceeds 5% after
three quarters in Islamic banks, conventional bank credits do not respond significantly to policy
shocks. Our findings thus support the view that the existence of a lending channel is particularly
relevant for Islamic banks.
We explain above findings both from supply and demand side of lending. Regarding the supply
side of lending, all these results suggest that Islamic banks were worse in complementing deposit
withdrawals with alternative sources of funds. These findings are related to those of Carpenter
and Demiralp (2009) and Demiralp (2008) who argue that banks in emerging countries may not be
capable of finding alternative sources to replace deposits as the banks of advanced countries which
can find funding sources via alternative borrowing instruments, like bond issuances. As Islamic
banks are small and have limited access to funding, lending in these banks are more responsive to
monetary shocks (Kishan and Opiela, 2000).
In view of the demand side of lending, the results show that the bank lending channel of
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monetary transmission is more effective on SMEs. SMEs are more vulnerable to monetary shocks
due to the shortage of available funds at a bearable cost. This is in line with the findings of Ali
et al. (2012) and Hubbard et al. (2002) who find that SMEs disproportionately share the burden
of a monetary shock. Although a strong relationship with a bank may save SMEs from monetary
shocks to some extent (Zaheer et al., 2013), long–lived monetary shocks hit SMEs more severe
than large businesses. Moreover, larger firms are less affected by the higher cost of policy rate
changes through recourse of alternative funding sources. This is especially true when the firms’
expected future profits from the projects for which they are applying credit are well above the
burden of monetary shocks. Our findings thus support the view that the existence of the bank
lending channel is particularly relevant for SMEs as they are more vulnerable to monetary shocks
(Kishan and Opiela, 2000).
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Although our main research focus is the examination of the impact of monetary shocks on
deposits and credits, the panel–VAR framework we build also combines the interrelations between
macroeconomic variables and bank–level variables. We hereafter explore how various macroeco-
nomic shocks affect bank–level variables. It is worth noting before discussing the IRFs of bank–
variables to macroeconomic shocks that the IRFs pertaining to Islamic banks are larger and most
of them are close to significance at 95% level, while the IRFs of conventional banks are smaller in
magnitude and often insignificant, which confirms more responsiveness of Islamic banks.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the responses of credits and deposits in Islamic and conventional banks to
inflation shocks. Both credits and deposits in Islamic banks respond negatively to inflation shocks.
Credits and deposits in conventional banks also respond similarly, but the response of deposits at
the initial quarters is positive and then turns out to be negative afterwards. The responses are larger
and significant in Islamic banks similar to those responses to monetary shocks. The findings suggest
that depositors demand higher interest against higher inflation and thus shrinking net return. Once
their higher return demand is not met by the banks, depositors consider switching to other banks
or withdrawing their deposit to invest in other investments or keep it in cash. Since Islamic banks
can not alter their rates paid on deposits swiftly to offset net return losses, Islamic bank depositors
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become more disadvantageous relative to conventional bank depositors. The credits response to
inflation is explicable from changing supply and demand conditions of lending at different inflation
regimes. Due to uncertainty created by positive inflation shocks, credit supply and demand face
with significant deterioration (Basci, 2006; Brooks, 2007). Banks’ preference to credits is reduced
by higher returns offered by other assets, e.g. government bonds. Moreover, SMEs’ demand for
credit shrinks due to higher capital expenditure and increased cost of production for goods. Larger
businesses are generally better positioned to bear the brunt of inflation, as the burden can be offset
by savings generated by economies of scale. SMEs, however, often take a direct hit on margin from
inflation shocks. The end result is the more reduction of credit demand in Islamic banks.
[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The responses to foreign exchange shocks is depicted in Figures 7 and 8. These figures, in line
with previous IRFs, suggest a negative relationship between foreign exchange rate and deposits
and credits. This is especially important since the appreciation of the foreign currency leads to de-
cline in deposits and credits. Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010) examine the role of various macroeconomic
factors on depositor behavior. The authors find that macroeconomic factors are important drivers
of depositor behavior in times of upheavals, sometimes even dominating the role of bank–specific
characteristics. During times of macroeconomic and monetary changes, bank portfolios may be
severely hit by the shocks (Brooks, 2007; Levy-Yeyati et al., 2010). The depositor discipline liter-
ature suggests that depositors punish or reward their banks based on their performance at these
times (see e.g. Mart´ınez-Per´ıa and Schmukler, 2001). Islamic banks are in general more liquid and
better capitalized to absorb these shocks however less capable to shield their loan portfolios from
monetary shocks. These banks are often constrained by limited sources of funds while conventional
banks can use larger pools of financing. This incapability is also related to the size of these banks,
as argued by Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Stein and Kashyap (2000), since small banks may find
it relatively more difficult to raise external funds in times of monetary tightening. The funding con-
straints may thus hit Islamic banks more severely than conventional banks. The greater response
of Islamic bank depositors to foreign exchange shocks may also be due to limited investment oppor-
tunities at Islamic banks, while these can be mitigated by various conventional instruments that
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introduce hedging against currency risks. Hence, a possible explanation for the larger decline in
Islamic bank deposits may be that depositors divert their deposits to foreign currency denominated
investments for hedging purposes as a response to the appreciation of foreign currencies (Blejer
et al., 2002).
Regarding the credits’ response, the rise in the foreign exchange rates, i.e., the appreciation of
the US dollar against domestic currency, is having a debilitating effect on SMEs. It could be argued
that export oriented SMEs enjoy the rise in foreign exchange rate, however SMEs face with surging
costs of energy in an oil dependent country and rising prices in intermediate goods. Additionally,
it is a common trend in emerging market countries that SMEs borrow in cheaper foreign currency,
although their cash inflows are mainly in domestic currency. When it is considered that hedging
practices against foreign currency risk is still at low levels in emerging economies, credit demands are
more often rejected due to heightened risks of the firms. This issue was underlined by Basci (2006)
who states that cheaper external borrowing coupled with the appreciation of domestic currency
spurred borrowing abroad in Turkey. The author however notes that customers often did not
hedge against currency risk, the end results of which is translated into sizeable credit risk for the
banking sector.
5.2 Robustness Checks
5.2.1 Alternative Estimations with Restricted Samples
We present two robustness tests with alternative estimations to check the validity of our results.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) propose that monetary policy is transmitted through several stages.
There is a spill–over from exchange rate to the inflation rate and that affects the general economy.
This assumption is valid for Turkey since foreign exchange fluctuations affect inflation with some
delay through the foreign trade channel. As an import–dependent economy with sizeable current
account deficits, the level of inflation in the country is closely dependent on foreign exchange rate.
However, due to complex interactions between the variables, we check the sensitivity of our results
with alternative orderings as the first robustness check (see e.g. Grossmann et al., 2014; Lof and
Malinen, 2014; Kim and Lee, 2008, for similar sensitivity analysis). We try several other orderings
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and re–estimate the panel–VAR. The main results remain unchanged. As we run various orderings,
the results are not reported here to save space but are available upon request from the authors.
During the inspection of the bank observations, it is noticeable that the heterogeneity in the
conventional bank sample is significant. For instance, several conventional banks operate for over
a century and have an extensive branch coverage. On the other hand, some of the conventional
banks operate around thirty years and their branch coverage is still expanding. The characteristics
of banks, e.g. size, age, branch coverage, can directly have an impact on the behavior of bank
deposits and credits. Although we consider cross sectional heterogeneity by employing the panel–
VAR framework, we study a more restricted but matched sample of conventional banks as the
second robustness check. As a benchmark, we focus on the average asset size of the banks during
the sample period. We arbitrarily select those banks whose average asset size is larger than 10
billion Turkish Lira and obtain a restricted bank sample that are more comparable with Islamic
banks in terms of their asset size. In doing so, the number of conventional banks is reduced to
fifteen banks.
The estimation results and impulse responses do not change by restricting the sample. In the
restricted sample, we obtain significant responses for credits which have been insignificant in the
whole sample.6 The composition of credit portfolio in Islamic banks is the main reason why credits
respond significantly and largely to monetary and macroeconomic shocks in Islamic banks. Since
small banks are more specialized in SME lending (Hubbard et al., 2002; Shaban et al., 2014),
credits’ responses in the restricted sample turn out to be significant.
5.2.2 The Impact of Portfolio Composition
Our final robustness test is about our explanation on the larger responses of credits to monetary
and macroeconomic shocks in Islamic banks. While discussing the larger responses of credits in
Islamic banks to monetary and corresponding macroeconomic shocks, we emphasized the composi-
tional differences in credit portfolios between Islamic and conventional banks. Our main argument
was that Islamic banks are more inclined to finance SMEs which are more vulnerable to monetary
and macroeconomic shocks. To test the validity of this argument, we solely employ SME credits
6See Figure 13 in the Appendix.
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of both conventional and Islamic banks. By restricting the credits sample to only SME credits, we
are able to check the robustness of our argument whether or not the composition of credit portfolio
is an important factor in the relationship between monetary policy and credits.
We take the SME definition of Turkish Statistical Institute as a baseline to identify SME credits.
According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (Tu¨rkiye I˙statistik Kurumu in Turkish), micro–sized
enterprises are those having less than 10 employees or annual sales of less than 1 million Turkish
Liras, whereas small enterprises are the businesses having 10–49 employees or annual sales of 1–5
million Turkish Liras. Finally, medium–sized enterprises have 50–249 employees or annual sales of
5–25 million Turkish Liras. The credits in a bank portfolio is named as SME credits if they are
extended to any of these enterprises. To check how SME credits in conventional banks and Islamic
banks respond to policy rate changes, we estimate a bivariate VAR model which incorporates SME
credits instead of total credits.
[INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE]
As an initial exercise for the final robustness check, we do not only estimate the bivariate model
for Islamic banks, but also for different conventional bank ownership forms. Figure 9 presents
the responses of SME credits to policy rate changes in private banks, foreign banks, state banks
and Islamic banks. This classification enables us to explore any differences in the responses once
it is considered that SME credit responses in different bank ownerships, i.e. foreign banks and
state–owned banks, can be totally different. The evidence supports the claim that foreign banks
are expected to shy away from SME lending (De Haas et al., 2010; Detragiache et al., 2008; Clarke
et al., 2006; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), on the other hand state–owned banks can be used
as a special vehicle to support development and alleviate the burden of crisis on SMEs (World
Bank, 2012). The bivariate VAR results show that except for foreign banks, SME credits respond
significantly to policy rate changes in all bank types. The response of SME credits in Islamic banks
is the largest which is in line with our previous findings. However, the response of SME credits in
state–owned banks is the smallest which may suggest that these banks are mandated to support
SME financing. When SMEs are hit by monetary and macroeconomic shocks, state–owned banks
would be the likely ones which would be more likely to continue lending to SMEs as expanding
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access to finance is often among their top objectives (Behr et al., 2013; De Haas et al., 2010). We
also estimate the same bivariate VAR model for conventional (private and state banks) and Islamic
banks. Figure 10 suggests that SME credits in conventional and Islamic banks are both responsive
to monetary shocks. Overall, our findings deliver a strong support for the finding that large and
significant response of credits’ response in Islamic banks is largely due to their tendency towards
financing SMEs.
6 Concluding Remarks
There is a growing debate on the differences between Islamic and conventional banking. This
paper provides new insights for why the bank lending channel works differently for Islamic banks
compared to their conventional counterparts. Our main finding is that Islamic banks’ credits and
deposits are significantly more responsive to policy rate changes, indicating the significance of the
balance sheet channel through these banks in the transmission of monetary policy.
Possible explanations for this finding are related to deposits and credits in both banking schemes.
At the liabilities side, we highlight Islamic depositors’ risk aversion and the inertia of rates at
Islamic banks behind the stronger response of Islamic deposits. Religiosity is generally associated
with higher risk aversion that might lead to larger deposit withdrawal against a positive monetary
shock. Further, Islamic banks are highly dependent on deposit–funding which makes them more
responsive to monetary shocks. The prohibition of interest in Islamic banking prevents them to
adjust their deposit rates swiftly. Islamic banks can only change their rates through some indirect
manipulations and with some delay during which depositors may withdraw their deposits. At
the assets side, we emphasize that Islamic banks’ tendency towards SMEs financing is one of the
fundamental reasons for why credits in Islamic banks are more responsive to policy rate changes.
This demonstrates that monetary transmission is more effective through Islamic banks and those
small–sized conventional banks having strong relations with SMEs.
In the context of high growth expectations for the Islamic banking industry worldwide, it is
crucial for regulators to understand whether Islamic banking has desirable outcomes or some unin-
tended side effects on financial stability and real economy. We find that monetary transmission is
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more effective through Islamic banks which helps policymakers to manage economy in a smoother
way. Since SMEs add significantly to labour force participation in domestic economies and Is-
lamic banks have certain advantages in SME lending, central banks’ control over employment and
domestic output can be facilitated through Islamic banking. However, since Islamic banks are
more responsive to monetary and macroeconomic shocks–and so do SMEs, central banks should be
aware that monetary contractions might have repercussions on unemployment and growth through
Islamic banks.
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7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Banking System
credits Total credits 975 14.81 2.44 6.11 18.52
deposits Total deposits 986 13.39 2.71 6.10 17.47
Conventional Banks
credits Total credits 847 14.74 2.60 6.11 18.52
deposits Total deposits 858 13.25 2.87 6.10 17.47
Islamic Banks
credits Total credits 128 15.27 0.71 13.70 16.54
deposits Total deposits 128 14.38 0.55 13.05 15.33
Macroeconomic and Monetary Variables
fx US Dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate 986 1.49 0.19 1.17 1.86
cpi Quarterly change in consumer price index 953 3.16 2.28 -0.58 10.76
ir Policy rate 986 11.45 5.81 1.50 21.48
Note: The deposit and credit amounts are in thousand Turkish Liras and are log–transformed. The
policy rate is the quarterly average of overnight money market rate. Consumer price index is the
quarterly change in consumer price index. Foreign exchange rate is the quarterly average of US
Dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate.
Table 2: Panel Unit Root Tests
Variable Definition Augmented Dickey–Fuller Phillips–Perron
Conventional Banks
credits Total credits 147.34*** 78.90**
h–credits Helmert–transformed total credits 161.76*** 115.90***
deposits Total deposits 89.92*** 161.75***
h–deposits Helmert–transformed total deposits 84.90*** 141.03***
Islamic Banks
credits Total credits 27.64*** 14.90*
h–credits Helmert–transformed total credits 24.94*** 14.74*
deposits Total deposits 23.37*** 25.13***
h–deposits Helmert–transformed total deposits 19.01** 14.90*
Macroeconomic and Monetary Variables
fx US Dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate 92.08** 96.17**
h–fx Helmert–transformed US Dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate 277.18*** 85.31*
cpi Quarterly change in consumer price index 710.88*** 941.97***
h–cpi Helmert–transformed quarterly change in consumer price index 680.35*** 965.84***
ir Policy rate 92.08** 96.17**
h–ir Helmert–transformed policy rate 178.95*** 127.50***
Note: The deposit and credit amounts are in thousand Turkish Liras and are log–transformed. The policy rate is the
quarterly average of overnight money market rate. Consumer price index is the quarterly change in consumer price index.
Foreign exchange rate is the quarterly average of US Dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate. ”h–” represents the Helmert–
transformation that is used in the panel–VARs.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses of Deposits to Policy Rate Shocks: Conventional versus Islamic
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses of Credits to Policy Rate Shocks: Conventional versus Islamic
Banks
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses of Deposits to Inflation Shocks: Conventional versus Islamic
Banks
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses of Credits to Inflation Shocks: Conventional versus Islamic
Banks
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses of Deposits to Foreign Exchange Shocks: Conventional versus
Islamic Banks
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses of Credits to Foreign Exchange Shocks: Conventional versus
Islamic Banks
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses of SME Credits to Policy Rate Shocks: Different Bank Types
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Figure 10: Impulse Responses of SME Credits to Policy Rate Shocks: Conventional versus
Islamic Banks
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Figure 11: Impulse Responses for Conventional Banks
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Figure 12: Impulse Responses for Islamic Banks
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Figure 13: Impulse Responses for Restricted Conventional Banks
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